نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
Custom (ʿurf) constitutes a significant phenomenon in Shiite jurisprudence (fiqh), with which Shiite jurisprudential literature became increasingly familiar following the ascendancy of Usuli jurists (mujtahidīn uṣūlī) over Akhbaris (akhbārīs). Since the recent century, Shiite jurisprudence has adopted novel terminologies including established practice (sīrah) and the convention of the rational (banāʾ ʿuqalāʾ), resulting in the relative efficacy of custom in the domains of jurisprudence and independent legal reasoning (ijtihād). Notably, despite this importance, the application of custom—particularly in politics and political jurisprudence—has been sporadic, with limited operational and practical attention accorded to it. Consequently, this research investigates the reasons for neglecting custom in politics and political jurisprudence while elucidating barriers to its consideration. Utilizing a descriptive-analytical method, findings indicate that the dominance of Akhbari thought—due to restricting the sources of legal inference (istinbāṭ al-aḥkām) and adopting a minimalist approach to religion—constitutes the "primary barrier to considering custom and established practice." Although Usuli thought, through expanding sources and employing reason (ʿaql) and independent legal reasoning, advocates the connection between religion and politics and thus represents the "most suitable premise for engaging with custom and established practice," it too has not accorded serious practical attention to custom. With the proliferation of Akhbari thought and the dominance of factors such as excluding reason from inferring religious rulings (upon which political jurisprudence depends), a mentality of rigidity (jumūd), traditionalism (taḥajjur), and precautionary inclination (iḥtiyāṭ-gerāyī) will promote the notion of separating religion from politics—an approach that becomes the foremost barrier to adhering to custom and established practice. Therefore, given core components of Akhbari thought such as hadith-centrism (ḥadīth-maḥwārī), belief in governance exclusively by the Infallible Imam (A.S.), and non-admissibility of reason in establishing governance, no scope remains for recourse to custom and rational conventions (sīrah ʿuqalāʾī). This approach and Akhbari predominance induced a form of precaution among Usuli jurists and mujtahids regarding serious engagement with custom; additionally, the foundational and comprehensive Sunni perspective toward custom prompted heightened precaution among Usuli jurists. Thus, Akhbari opposition to independent legal reasoning, the predominance of Akhbarism, and the Usuli jurists' failure to expand inference proofs (adillah al-istinbāṭ) due to practical and behavioral precautions constitute two primary factors for the practical neglect of custom.
کلیدواژهها English
